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Business rescue: How can its success be evaluated at 
company level?
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1A B S T R A C T
1The question of what constitutes a successful business rescue is a very 
topical and unanswered one. Reports on success are contradictory and 
seem to lack a set of standardised evaluation criteria. The purpose of 
this article is to investigate how business rescue success is evaluated 
internationally in order to develop a set of criteria that can be used to 
evaluate business rescue success at company level in South Africa. A 
comparative review approach was used to investigate data from four 
leading international countries with similar business rescue regimes. 
A number of evaluation criteria were identifi ed and aligned with the 
business rescue legislation as set out in Chapter 6 of the South African 
Companies Act. The fi ndings indicated that the international business 
rescue regimes and Chapter 6 share similar goals. Several criteria for 
evaluating success were identifi ed, the key indicators being the going 
concern status on exiting business rescue, and whether the return 
to creditors was maximised as opposed to liquidation. It was further 
found that an initial exit as a going concern may be a short-term 
success indicator. Success can ultimately only be established if further 
investigation after some time period indicates no re-fi ling for business 
rescue.
2Key words: business rescue, South African Companies Act, success, evaluation, going 
concern, liquidation, stakeholders, restructuring
Introduction
“Measurement is the first step that leads to control and eventually to improve-
ment. If you can’t measure something, you can’t understand it. If you can’t un-
derstand it, you can’t control it. If you can’t control it, you can’t improve it.”
1H. James Harrington
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1The South African Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008) introduced a business rescue 
regime for financially distressed companies. The Chapter 6 business rescue 
provision has been available to financially distressed companies since 1 May 2011. 
A successful business rescue regime is likely to have an impact in the South African 
business world in general, and a direct impact on various stakeholders such as 
creditors, employees and customers. The quality of corporate rescue legislation will 
depend mainly upon the principles by which it is measured (Hunt & Handa 2005). 
According to the Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC), the 
success of business rescue legislation in South Africa must be monitored closely to 
ensure that South Africa sets an example not only nationally, but also internationally 
(CIPC 2014).
The question of what constitutes a successful rescue is very topical among 
academics and practitioners, with no answers to date (Pretorius 2013). Some initial 
statistics that have been published paint different pictures: in March 2013, Webber 
Wentzel reported a success rate of 55% out of a sample of 117 companies in the 
period May 2011 to March 2012 (Webber Wentzel 2013). Terblanche, a director with 
professional services firm Mazars who is responsible for its business rescue services 
division, reported an 8% success rate for 2012, while mentioning that statistics 
circulated by the CIPC during 2013 reveal a real rate of success of between 12% and 
15% of all businesses that have concluded their rescue operations (Terblanche 2014). 
Using the CIPC’s figures for terminations indicated in the ‘Notice of substantial 
implementation’ filings, Pretorius (2014: 28) calculates the success rate as 9.4%.
Apart from Pretorius’s calculation, none of the other reported statistics disclosed 
the criteria used for the evaluation of success. It seems that no formal set of evaluation 
criteria or guidelines is available. Van Schalkwyk, a team manager of the CIPC’s 
business rescue division, confirmed the notion and indicated that research into such 
a set of evaluation criteria would be valuable to the CIPC (D. van Schalkwyk [Team 
leader], pers. comm., 29 February 2014).
Research in the corporate recovery sphere has focused mainly on two aspects. 
Firstly, a vast body of literature exists for predicting financial distress and developing 
models to assist stakeholders with these predictions, most notably Altman’s Z-Score 
and ZETA™ models (Altman 1968: 589; Altman, Haldeman & Narayanan 1977: 29). 
Secondly, researchers focused on what constitutes a good rescue regime and analysed 
individual rescue regimes to identify strengths and weaknesses, or compared and 
contrasted different rescue regimes to each other in order to identify principles that, 
if applied or removed, would lead to the success of the particular regime. Factors 
such as the manner of entering the proceedings, the extent of court involvement, how 
voting is conducted, the various costs for the affected parties, how speedy the regime 
Business rescue: How can its success be evaluated at company level?
3 
is, whether or not an external administrator is preferable, and the information that a 
creditor would need to take a decision on the company’s future, were often debated 
(Routledge & Gadenne 2000; Denis & Rodgers 2007; Anderson 2008; Krüger 2010; 
Yang & Li 2012). However, limited research has been undertaken to evaluate the 
success in terms of the goals of the particular regime. The low incidence of research 
in this area is also surprising, given the importance of determining how well any 
changes to a regime, such as those aspects highlighted above, contributed to the 
saving of financially distressed business, and the related benefits to society and the 
economy as a whole.
Aim of the study
1The CIPC, which acts as the regulator of business rescues in South Africa, needs 
to report on the success of business rescue legislation for its own performance 
evaluation purposes, and also for transparency to the general public and government. 
The drafting, implementation, monitoring, improvement and reporting of any 
piece of legislation is expensive. At the moment, reporting to the public on business 
rescue is limited to the recording of basic statistics such as the number of companies 
entering business rescue, the number of notices to end proceedings, and the number 
of appointed and licensed business rescue practitioners (CIPC 2013: 21).
In order to evaluate the success of the current South African business rescue 
regime, one needs to evaluate the outcome of individual companies that went 
through the business rescue process. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to develop 
a set of success indicators at company level that are fit for the South African business 
environment and supportive of the purpose of the South African business rescue 
legislation, and not to elaborate on the legislation itself.
Using the indicators to evaluate success will aid the Department of Trade and 
Industry as legislator and the CIPC as regulator to better understand the effect of the 
current legislation and to improve the overall success of the business rescue legislation 
in the long term.
In order to achieve the research aim, the study attempts to answer the following 
research questions:
• What are the goals of the legislation?
• Based on international legislation, are there criteria, supported by indicators, that 
can be used to evaluate the success of the regime at company level?
• Based on international legislation, if criteria and supporting indicators are 
available, can they be used or adapted for use in the evaluation of success in a 
South African business rescue context?
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Research design
1The study was guided by the research questions indicated above, and designed in 
the manner set out in Table 1 to achieve the research objective.
Table 1: Research design components
iComponent iiDescription
iiiResearch question or 
problem
ivAre there criteria, based on international legislation, that 
can be used to evaluate business rescue success in South 
Africa at company level?
vContext viBusiness rescue
viiPropositions viiiThe goals of the rescue legislation are clear;
ixThere are criteria, supported by indicators, that can 
be used to evaluate the success of the business rescue 
regime at company level; and
xThese criteria and indicators can be adapted and applied 
to evaluate the success of Chapter 6 business rescue in 
South Africa at company level.
xiPhenomena 
investigated
xiiThe goals of business rescue legislation; and
xiiiThe evaluation criteria and indicators involved.
xivUnits of observation xvLiterature;
xviInternational rescue regimes; and
xviiSouth African Companies Act (No. 71 of 2008), with specifi c reference to 
Chapter 6.
xviiiLogic linking the data 
to the propositions
xixThe goals, success evaluation criteria and indicators 
should be available in the international literature to judge 




xxiSimilar goals to South African business rescue legislation;
xxiiSuccess evaluation criteria and indicators used in 
international business rescue regimes; and
xxiiiApplicability of the criteria to Chapter 6 business rescue 
in South Africa. 
1Source:  Adapted from Yin (2009: 27); Pretorius & Holtzhauzen (2013: 473); Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith 
(2014: 125).
1The paper draws data from current legislation, as well as from empirical and non-
empirical research, to understand how the success of a chosen regime is evaluated at 
company level in countries other than South Africa, particularly those countries that 
have used similar corporate rescue regimes for some time. To this extent, legislation, 
research and other relevant information pertaining to the corporate rescue regimes 
in Australia, Canada, the United States of America and the United Kingdom were 
studied in order to note how the success of the chosen regime was determined in 
terms of its stated goals.
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The nature of the research was descriptive, of a qualitative form and relied on 
textual data. The focus was on theory construction/discovery (Olalere 2011: 22). The 
researchers therefore applied grounded theory principles to the comparative review 
of data from within the business rescue context and were theoretically sensitive to 
recognise any themes and patterns emerging from the data (Olalere 2011: 24). The 
data were accordingly systematically and simultaneously collected and analysed for 
themes on and patterns in the evaluation of the success of a business rescue regime 
at company level (Goulding 2002: 170). A recent study by one of the leading South 
African researchers in business rescue has successfully implemented the grounded 
theory approach to gain international directives on the expectations of the business 
rescue plan (Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith 2014).
The next section briefly describes the goals of the South African business rescue 
legislation, followed by the investigation and analysis of the data (legislation, empirical 
and non-empirical research and other relevant information) on the international 
rescue regimes. The literature review is followed by the section describing the 
findings and linking the findings to the different research propositions in order to 
arrive at a set of criteria to evaluate the success of business rescue in South Africa.
Literature review
1In order to investigate how international rescue regimes are being evaluated, 
the sections below are set up as follows: for each country investigated a brief 
introduction is given into the available legislation, with special emphasis on the 
goals of the legislation, before investigating how the success of the particular regime 
is evaluated.
South Africa
1The Companies Act of 2008 defines “business rescue” as proceedings to facilitate 
the rehabilitation of a financially distressed company through the temporary 
supervision of the affairs, business and property of the company. The temporary 
supervision is allowed under a temporary moratorium on the rights of claimants 
against the company or in respect of property in its possession, while a plan to rescue 
the company by restructuring its affairs, business, property, debt, other liabilities and 
equity is developed and implemented in a manner that maximises the likelihood of 
the company continuing in existence on a solvent basis or, if it is not possible for 
the company to so continue in existence, results in a better return for the company’s 
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creditors or shareholders than would result from the immediate liquidation of the 
company (RSA: s. 128(1)(b)).
The goal of the legislation, and what can be considered a successful rescue in terms 
of the legislation, can be seen from the above, namely that a rescue will be considered 
successful if the company will return to continue in existence (i.e. a going concern), 
or if the realisation of assets under business rescue will result in a better return for the 
company’s creditors and shareholders than under immediate liquidation.
Business rescue proceedings may be initiated voluntarily by the company through 
a board resolution, or may be initiated by an affected person by application to the 
court. A business rescue practitioner is appointed with specific powers and duties 
(see Companies Act Chapter 6, Part B) and takes full management control of the 
company in place of its board and management. The practitioner is responsible for 
the development of a business rescue plan to be considered by affected persons at the 
second creditors’ meeting, and the implementation thereof once it has been adopted 
(RSA: s. 129, 131, 151 & 152).
The Act states that business rescue proceedings end when (a) the court sets aside 
the resolution or order that began the proceedings or has converted those proceedings 
into liquidation proceedings; or (b) the practitioner has filed with the CIPC a notice 
of the termination of business rescue proceedings; or (c) a business rescue plan has 
been (i) proposed and rejected in terms of Part D of this Chapter, and no affected 
person has acted to extend the proceedings in any manner contemplated in section 
153; or (ii) adopted in terms of Part D of this Chapter, and the practitioner has 
subsequently filed a notice of substantial implementation of that plan (RSA: s. 132).
Although the saving of jobs is not a specific goal as set out in section 128(b), the 
rights of employees are protected during business rescue proceedings. Their rights are 
protected due to the fact that immediately before the beginning of the proceedings, 
employees of the company continue to be employed on the same terms and conditions, 
except to the extent that changes occur in the ordinary course of attrition, or the 
employees and the company agree different terms and conditions in accordance 
with applicable labour laws. Any retrenchment of an employee contemplated in 
the business rescue plan is subject to the applicable sections of employment-related 
legislation (RSA: s. 136).
According to Bradstreet (2011: 371), the South African Companies Act is now also 
in line with developments in international insolvency law by providing for informal 
“work-outs” or “pre-packaged” administrations. To this extent, Part E of Chapter 
6 deals with a compromise with creditors and applies to a company, irrespective of 
whether or not it is financially distressed (S 155 (1)). Bradstreet (2011: 371) describes 
the compromise with creditors as an informal alternative to the business rescue 
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proceedings. It should be noted that this study focuses only on the formal business 
rescue proceedings as described in parts A to D.
If we want to evaluate the success of South African business rescue legislation, 
are there any international criteria or guidance with indicators of success that we 
can study and adapt to serve as criteria and indicators for business rescue success 
evaluation in South Africa? The next section investigates how success is evaluated 
in the United States of America, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom at 
company level.
United States of America
1Reorganisation in the United States is governed by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy 
Code of 1978. Chapter 11 reorganisation has been put in place as an alternative to 
immediate liquidation of a business, which is dealt with under Chapter 7. Debtors 
sometimes file for liquidation under Chapter 11, rather than Chapter 7, because it is 
economically more advantageous than liquidation under Chapter 7. It also permits 
the creditors to take a more active role in the liquidation process (United States 
Courts 2014). The focus of this study is on an evaluation of the outcome of the 
Chapter 11 reorganisation plan, rather than the liquidation plan.
Once a debtor files for a Chapter 11 reorganisation, there will be a 120-day 
moratorium on the rights of creditors. During this period, the debtor (current 
management) remains in control of the company, also known as the debtor-in-
possession principle. The debtor is responsible for fulfilling all duties with regard 
to the Chapter 11 filing. One of the responsibilities of the debtor will be to file a 
plan of reorganisation, which is similar to the business rescue plan under the South 
African business rescue proceedings. The US trustees mainly monitor the progress 
of a Chapter 11 case (United States Courts 2014).
Reorganisation plans need to be approved by the majority of creditors, and 
ultimately by the court (Dal Pont & Griggs 1996: 48). The court must be satisfied 
that all requirements of the legislation are met. Among other things, section 1129 
requires the plan to be feasible (Dal Pont & Griggs 1996: 49). In order to satisfy 
the feasibility requirement, the court must find that confirmation of the plan is not 
likely to be followed by a liquidation (unless the plan is a liquidation plan) or further 
financial reorganisation (United States Courts 2014). According to the drafters of 
Chapter 11, the purpose of reorganisation is to restructure a business so that it may 
continue to operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors and produce 
a return to its shareholders. The Supreme Court of the United States said that the 
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main purpose of Chapter 11 was to prevent a company from going into liquidation 
(Jensen-Conklin 1992: 301).
From the above, it is clear that a company is expected to continue as a going 
concern post-Chapter 11 reorganisation. One criterion of “success” is emergence 
from Chapter 11 as a going concern, and another is that the company does not re-file 
for Chapter 11. The following paragraphs investigate which indicators were used by 
different researchers in order to evaluate the success of reorganisation cases.
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts did a study on Chapter 
11 cases filed after 1987. Of the cases studied, 30% resulted in confirmed plans for 
reorganisation (some of which would experience financial stress again in the future), 
and about 30% included plans for the piecemeal liquidation of assets (Rasmussen 
1991: 322).
It is relatively easy to distinguish between the number of going concern entities 
and liquidated entities exiting Chapter 11, but is this distinction enough to determine 
success? According to Hotchkiss, John, Thorburn & Mooradian (2008: 31), researchers 
need to evaluate the performance of a going concern company for some time post-
Chapter 11. If a company performs poorly post-Chapter 11, then Chapter 11 only 
prolonged the liquidation process of an unprofitable company. Continued poor 
operating performance or further restructuring following Chapter 11 reorganisation 
implies that the reorganisation failed, as the company is not economically viable in 
the long run.
If reorganisation success depends on the subsequent performance of a company, 
this brings us to another question: How do we evaluate subsequent performance of 
going concern entities? Hotchkiss et al. (2008: 33) found that 40% of the companies 
they examined experienced operating losses in the first three years after Chapter 
11 reorganisation. Ratio analysis such as return on assets and profit margins were 
used as indicators of a successful reorganisation. Aivazian and Zhou (2012: 235) 
used either the operating income over total assets or cash flow over total asset ratios 
as performance indicators. Based on operating income, the performance of Chapter 
11 cases was on par with their matched peer companies (companies that did not 
file for Chapter 11). Changes in cash flows for Chapter 11 cases, from the pre-filing 
year to the first post-filing year, were found to have improved dramatically. Aivazian 
and Zhou (2012: 230) were able to evaluate some of the companies in their original 
investigation for another three years, and found that improvement in operating cash 
flows was more pronounced in the long run.
According to LoPucki and Whitford (1992: 600), a reorganisation would be 
considered a success if the company emerged from bankruptcy with less debt or 
improved profitability, or both. This indicates that debt ratios and, once again, 
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profitability ratios are important. Aivazian and Zhou (2012: 247) found that 
reorganised firms significantly reduce liabilities to help boost their net operating 
cash flows after emerging from bankruptcy. Debt ratios used in their investigation 
include the quick ratio (to measure liquidity), interest cover ratio, market value of 
equity over total liabilities, secured debt over total liabilities and trade credits over 
total assets.
Alderson and Betker (1999) evaluated post-Chapter 11 performances by 
calculating an estimated return that could have been earned if the company’s assets 
were liquidated and the proceeds invested in a portfolio of shares. They took the 
market value of 89 companies five years after emerging from bankruptcy, added 
all cash distributions that were made to claimholders, and compared this amount 
to an estimated value if the assets would have been liquidated at emergence. This 
annualised return was compared to the return of the S&P index over the same time 
period. Based on cash flow returns, the Chapter 11 companies performed on par with 
the market as a whole (Alderson & Betker 1999: 68). Although the annualised return 
success indicator seems to be an evaluation of company performance rather than an 
evaluation of a Chapter 11 success, the indicator is indeed important as it shows that 
Chapter 11 reorganised companies can be economically viable and perform on par 
with other companies in the long run.
In the evaluation of post-Chapter 11 performance of a company, one should keep 
in mind that operating profitability after emergence will probably be strongly related 
to the share performance of the overall market, and not all companies emerging from 
Chapter 11 will relist their shares. Hotchkiss et al. (2008: 34) found that only 60% of 
the companies they studied relisted on a stock exchange. Therefore, studies of post-
bankruptcy share performance may be biased to reflect only the best-performing 
companies (Hotchkiss et al. 2008: 34).
It is unclear how long a company should stay under the magnifying glass, as no 
definite time period for “post-restructuring assessment” was found. Aivazian and 
Zhou (2012) studied the operating performance of public companies that filed for 
reorganisation from 1987 to 2008. Their investigation extended from the pre-filing 
year to the end of the first post-filing year. According to Kahl (2002: 136), it takes time 
to understand whether a company is economically viable or not. Various subsequent 
restructurings do not necessarily mean that reorganisation was a bad idea (Kahl 
2002: 136).
Firms usually downsize their assets significantly during reorganisation attempts 
(LoPucki & Whitford 1992: 604; Aivazian & Zhou 2012: 247). This makes one wonder 
whether the evaluation of success might be influenced by a dramatic decrease in 
company size or by acquisition by another company (Warren & Westbrook 2009: 
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610). LoPucki and Whitford (1992: 602) use the term “shattering” when evaluating 
post-reorganisation performance. Shattering occurs when a significant part of a 
company is sold off in small parts to different buyers, or shut down because of lack 
of interest. If, without the sale of the key business, a company’s assets fall by more 
than 50% during the period of reorganisation, the company is considered to have 
shattered (LoPucki & Whitford 1992: 602). Liquidation plans often will mean that 
equity holders will lose their stake, but the business and its employees may continue 
under new ownership following a going concern sale. However, a liquidation plan 
may also mean the individual sale of a company’s assets, which is not very different 
from a typical Chapter 7 proceeding (Warren & Westbrook 2009: 611).
LoPucki and Whitford (1992: 603) further distinguish between “entity survival” 
and “business survival” when evaluating reorganisation success. From a corporate 
law point of view, survival means that a company emerges from reorganisation as 
the same legal entity, even though the assets it owns have changed radically. This 
is known as “entity survival”. It may, however, be more important for suppliers and 
customers that the key operations of the business survive, rather than the legal entity. 
This is called “business survival” (LoPucki & Whitford 1992: 602). For LoPucki 
and Whitford (1992: 602), the core business at filing must remain intact in a single 
company in order for the filing to be successful. This will be the case if a major portion 
of the assets remain under common ownership and fundamentally are committed to 
the same business purpose, whether that ownership is maintained by the same entity 
or in a new one. In a number of the Chapter 11 cases investigated, only a shell of the 
original company emerged from Chapter 11 for the principal purpose of preserving 
and using accumulated net operating losses (LoPucki & Whitford 1992: 612).
A reorganisation plan can be converted to a Chapter 7 liquidation plan if any party 
in interest files a motion to dismiss or convert the Chapter 11 case to a Chapter 7 case. 
The court will ultimately decide if this is in the best interest of the creditors and the 
estate (United States Courts 2014). Research has, however, shown that liquidating a 
company after an unsuccessful attempt at reorganising is expensive. Creditors would 
receive more if the company had originally filed for liquidation in terms of Chapter 
7 (Rasmussen 1991: 322).
It could be argued that Chapter 11 is a success if a company is liquidated, as long 
as this is in line with the agreement that is in place with the stakeholders. Sprayregen, 
Kieselstein and Seligman (2006: 25) believe that the most important thing in a 
reorganisation is how the company pictures its future post-reorganisation. In other 
words, how does the company define success for itself (Sprayregen et al. 2006: 25)? 
Chapter 11 reorganisation cases are considered successful by bankruptcy lawyers if 
reorganisation plans are confirmed (LoPucki & Whitford 1992: 599). However, this 
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indicator is not in line with the ultimate goal of Chapter 11 reorganisation, which is 
that the company must emerge as a going concern.
The previous paragraphs discussed the evaluation of Chapter 11 cases, mostly 
from a legal and financial point of view. It can be argued that bankruptcy legislation 
should also consider those who do not have a legal claim against the company, but are 
nevertheless affected by the continued operation of the company (Rasmussen 1991: 
324). A business may provide its employees, suppliers and customers with a sense of 
belonging that makes them feel secure and enriches their enjoyment of life. When 
a business shatters, this intangible benefit may be lost. This loss does not mean that 
shattering is an inappropriate outcome for Chapter 11 reorganisation, but it should 
be weighed against the gains that result from the redeployment of assets when a 
company shatters (LoPucki & Whitford 1992: 604).
Although the social impact mentioned above is a valid consideration, it could 
also be argued that bankruptcy law is not the place to address such a social concern 
(Rasmussen 1991: 324). One can have compassion for employees that are dismissed, 
but it may be unreasonable to expect business reorganisation to address these 
problems. From a straightforward business perspective, business reorganisation 
could be seen as successful if it provides the best return to the company’s creditors 
(Rasmussen 1991: 324).
To conclude this section, a summary of the evaluation criteria used by researchers 
is given. Research performed on Chapter 11 showed that reorganisation success can 
be evaluated by the following criteria and supporting indicators:
• Distinguishing between reorganisations, a shattering outcome (better return to 
creditors) and going concern asset sales;
• Determining if the outcome was in line with the accepted plan;
• Measuring the subsequent performance of an entity that has exited as a going 
concern through the use of ratios such as return on assets, profit margins, debt 
ratios as well as annualised returns in comparison to matched peer companies;
• Determining the number of times the entity subsequently re-filed for Chapter 11;
• Determining the return the creditors received under reorganisation compared to 
what would have been received from immediate liquidation; and
• Considering the impact on other stakeholders by measuring the change in asset 
size, and determining whether the core business was kept.
Canada
1Canada distinguishes between big companies and smaller companies when it 
comes to restructuring legislation. Companies with debt of over CAN$5 million 
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can apply for restructuring under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act 
(CCAA). Smaller companies can apply for restructuring under the Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Act (BIA). These two acts are the same in spirit, with small technical 
differences (Hunt & Handa 2005: 2). The purpose of the CCAA is to allow for the 
restructuring of bigger companies in order for the company to continue operations 
as a going concern (Rotem 2008: 16). In terms of the CCAA, liquidation is not part 
of the plan and must occur separately from and after the CCAA procedures have 
been followed (Sarra 2003; Hunt & Handa 2005; Rotem 2008). A restructuring plan 
(plan of arrangement) must be accepted by the majority of creditors of each class, 
and also by the Canadian court (Pretorius & Rosslyn-Smith 2014: 122).
It might be relatively easy to see how many companies emerged from these 
restructuring procedures solvent and as going concerns. Once again, the difficult 
aspect is to evaluate how well these rescued companies perform in the long run, 
unless one believes that any restructuring is inherently better than liquidation (Kent, 
Rostom, Maerov & Weerasooriya 2008: 1). One will need to quantify the ability of the 
company to remain solvent and be a vibrant member of the economy.
According to Hunt and Handa (2005: 27), one also needs to determine if the 
overall return to creditors is in line with their expectations. Consideration must be 
given to the improvement in operations, and the benefit of returning a business that 
might potentially become insolvent again in future to the business world (Hunt & 
Handa 2005: 27).
Research done in Canada indicates that the effectiveness of their restructuring 
legislation can be evaluated by asking the same questions as in the United States. As 
a starting point, the following questions would be relevant: How many companies 
return to solvency once they enter creditor protection? How many companies 
liquidate once they enter creditor protection? Of the companies that liquidate, what 
is the average return to creditors? (Hunt & Handa 2005: 27).
Oliver Hart argues that an optimal reorganisation procedure must maximise 
the proceeds received by the existing claimants (Fisher & Martel 1999: 235). Again, 
it should be borne in mind that economists may evaluate success differently from 
socialists. The Canadian government expressly states that the goal is to protect all 
stakeholders, thus including clients and employees (Sarra 2003: 85). The general 
consent is that an otherwise viable company that requires temporary protection from 
creditors to return to solvency should be allowed this chance for survival (Hunt & 
Handa 2005; Rotem 2008: 125). This will ensure future employment and give better 
protection to suppliers (Sarra 2003: 92).
Pritchard (2004: 118) noted that it is difficult to determine the success of CCAA 
proceedings in terms of asset value and recovered value. Pritchard (2004: 118) 
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eventually decided that respondents would be questioned about how far the case 
had proceeded. The ultimate criterion of success was whether the plan had been 
carried out successfully. The Superintendent of Bankruptcy in Canada uses the same 
standard in assessing the success of proposals under the BIA. As no standard was 
seen as perfect, the investigators concluded that the study should focus on those cases 
where the company had proposed a plan of arrangement that had been accepted by 
its creditors, approved by the court and carried out (Pritchard 2004: 116).
A study was done in Canada on all CCAA cases that commenced between 1997 
and 2002. It was decided that a case would be seen as successful if the court-approved 
plan was implemented. Of the 79 cases examined, 37% were successful, 45% were 
unsuccessful and 18% were ongoing at the time of the study (Pritchard 2004: 116).
From the above it is clear that the following evaluation criteria and indicators for 
success can be used:
• Determining if the entity exited restructuring as a going concern;
• In the event of a subsequent liquidation, determining if the average return to 
creditors is maximised; and
• Determining if the approved plan was implemented.
Australia
1The Corporations Act of 2001 (Cth) provides for credit relief to companies in 
Australia through a process called voluntary administration (VA) (Hunt & Handa 
2005: 1). Hunt and Handa (2005: 1) state that the objectives are similar to Canada’s 
CCAA proceedings, while Anderson (2008: 111) concludes that the objectives are 
almost identical to those of South African business rescue procedures. The first 
objective of VA is to return the company to solvency and, if that is not possible, the 
second objective is to maximise the return to creditors and members as opposed to 
immediate liquidation (Hunt & Handa 2005: 2; Anderson 2008: 110). VA aims to 
achieve these objectives by facilitating a stay on creditor claims in order to provide 
an opportunity for the company to restructure its affairs for the benefit of creditors 
and other stakeholders rather than liquidation (Blazic 2010: 2).
An important principle of the VA legislation is the appointment of an independent 
individual, external to the company, as the “company administrator”. The duty of the 
company administrator is to investigate the financial position of the company and 
decide on the appropriate course of action (Dal Pont & Griggs 1995: 194). Possible 
options available to the company administrator are the execution of a deed of company 
arrangement (DOCA) to rescue the company, or the commencement of liquidation 
proceedings, which should result in a better return for creditors than the winding up 
S. Conradie & C. Lamprecht
14
of the company in the first place (O’Flynn & Mainsbridge 2008: 3–4). The DOCA 
is a rescue plan (Routledge & Gadenne 2000: 236; Anderson 2008: 124–125) and 
normally comes to an end when the conditions specified in the deed for termination 
are met, unless the provisions are not met and winding up commences (Sellars 2001: 
8). The DOCA is similar to the business rescue plan of the South African business 
rescue legislation, which is equally important to the successful outcome of South 
African businesses using business rescue proceedings.
The legal committee of the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee 
(CASAC 1998: 1), as well as Anderson (2008: 133), state that the VA procedures 
are popular in Australia, but do not provide any evidence indicating the actual use 
and success rate of companies using the proceedings. O’Flynn and Mainsbridge 
(2008: 2) confirm Anderson’s view that the Australian insolvency practitioners are 
happy with the VA regime, but point out that it is difficult to find hard evidence 
to determine its success. They state that, due to changing economic conditions, 
overlapping insolvency administrations (the simultaneous appointment of a receiver 
and liquidator) and changes to data collection and presentation methods, a numerical 
analysis is extremely difficult to do.
O’Flynn and Mainsbridge (2008: 3–4) provide some insights and state that the 
first objective, namely to maximise the chances of a company, or as much of its 
business as possible, to continue in existence will be reached with the execution of a 
DOCA in the form of a rescue plan. The second objective, namely the maximisation 
of the return to creditors and members as opposed to immediate liquidation, is the 
non-DOCA objective. The legislation allows about a month to conclude a rescue 
plan in the form of a DOCA. By looking at the number of VAs that result in DOCAs, 
one can get an idea of the success of VA (O’Flynn & Mainsbridge 2008: 3). O’Flynn 
and Mainsbridge found that, for a particular month in 2007, only 33% of VAs resulted 
in DOCAs, with the rest probably being wound up under the second non-DOCA 
objective. These rates correspond with the view of Sellars (2001: 10), who indicated 
that, from 1994 to 2001, between 25% and 50% of VAs were successfully converted 
into deeds of company arrangement, with the bulk of the remainder proceeding into 
liquidation.
O’Flynn and Mainsbridge make the point that, although the conclusion of a 
DOCA between a company and its creditors is a statutory outcome, it does not indicate 
the practical outcome of the DOCA. Their view is supported by the Australian Tax 
Authority (ATO), which has expressed scepticism about the bare use of statistics to 
demonstrate the success of VAs. The ATO reckons that success should be measured 
by the number of DOCAs that were complied with, rather than the number that were 
proposed and accepted by creditors. Routledge and Gadenne (2000: 247), in an earlier 
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study to determine variables that could distinguish successful from unsuccessful 
reorganisations, also used VAs that were concluded with deeds of arrangement.
O’Flynn and Mainsbridge also make the point that because a DOCA was not 
executed does not mean that the VA process had failed. It could be that transitioning into 
a winding up had resulted in a better return for creditors that an outright liquidation 
(O’Flynn & Mainsbridge 2008: 4–5). The Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) keeps statistics pertaining to external administration and 
insolvencies, but only lists the number of companies entering VA, without indicating 
the number of VAs successfully converted into DOCAs (ASIC 2014).
VA has been in use in Australia since 1993 (O’Flynn & Mainsbridge 2008: 2) 
and, because the DOCA is similar to the accepted Chapter 6 business rescue plan, 
the view of the ATO is of importance. Seeing that the VA and the South African 
regimes have similar goals, the Australian experience indicates the following points 
to consider in evaluating the success of the South African model:
• The number of accepted business rescue plans should be recorded;
• The number of business rescue plans that are executed with the company returning 
to solvency or liquidity after the filing of the notice of substantial implementation 
is important should be recorded; and
• The number of accepted business rescue plans that resulted in a liquidation on 
the basis of which creditors received more cents in the Rand than they would have 
received from an outright liquidation should be recorded.
United Kingdom
1In the United Kingdom (UK), companies in financial distress are allowed to 
restructure their affairs under the Insolvency Act of 1986, which provides for 
two rescue procedures, namely an “Administration” and a “Company Voluntary 
Arrangement (CVA)” (Nyombi 2011: 12). The Insolvency Act of 1986 was aimed at 
the rehabilitation and preservation of viable businesses, as well as offering the ailing 
company a better chance of survival by allowing it to undergo a reorganisation or 
an arrangement plan rather than facing liquidation or administrative receivership 
(Denis & Rodgers 2007: 177; Nyombi 2011: 17). The South African business rescue 
model reflects the same philosophy.
The administration order (AO) allows for the court or the holder of a floating 
charge (a type of secured creditor not found in South African law), as well as a 
company or its directors, to appoint an administrator for the company (Loubser 2010: 
172–173). The aims of the AO are, firstly, for the company (and not just the business) 
to survive as a going concern; secondly, for its assets to be realised for the benefit of 
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the creditors as a whole; and, lastly, for distribution to secured or preferential creditors 
(Lightman, Gale & Smith 2004: Appendix 1; Loubser 2010: 181–184). Loubser (2010: 
213) states that, because the allowed period of administration is limited to 12 months, 
it is seen as only a facilitative period for the company to prepare for the actual rescue, 
which may be achieved by means of a CVA or a compromise with creditors, or even 
liquidation. However, according to Blazy, Petey and Weill (2010: 27), the outcomes 
are indeed a CVA or liquidation, but also a successful reorganisation. Blazy et al. 
(2010: 9) quote 1989 statistics from Homan indicating that reorganisation happens 
in 8% of cases.
Turning to the CVA, Denis and Rodgers (2007: 177) state that it was introduced 
as a company-friendly approach intended to be a voluntary rescue process. According 
to Loubser (2010: 167), the process was initially hardly used due to the absence of a 
moratorium on actions by creditors, but was subsequently improved to include such 
a moratorium. The CVA aims to assist the rescue of the ailing company so that it 
can undergo a reorganisation or arrangement plan before insolvency sets in, in other 
words, develop and execute a business rescue plan. The above aims, namely to assist 
the company to survive as a going concern, and the better realisation of its assets 
through the development and execution of a business rescue plan, are also found in 
the South African business rescue model.
How successful are AOs and CVAs? Nyombi (2011: 23) states that the uptake of 
both procedures has been disappointing for several reasons, but mainly the cost for 
small companies. However, despite the low uptake, the UK Department of Trade 
and Industry reported that, by the year 1999, 67% of AOs and 75% of CVAs managed 
a partial or complete survival of the company (Nyombi 2011: 15). After the 2002 
reforms, mainly by means of the Enterprise Act of 2002, research done by Frisby 
(in Nyombi 2011) indicated that returns to secured and preferential creditors had 
improved from 29.3% to 34.6%, but those of unsecured creditors decreased from 6.7% 
to 2.8%. Blazy et al. (2010: 31) found similar returns to creditors. They compared 
the recovery rates for creditors in France, Germany and the UK and found that, in 
the UK for the period 1998 to 2005, returns to secured and preferential creditors 
under AO were 37.2%, as opposed to 25.3% under liquidation. Unsecured creditors 
recovered 3.5% under an AO, as opposed to 9.6% under liquidation (Blazy et al. 2010: 
31).
Cook and Pond (2006: 22) compared the insolvency regimes in the UK and 
Sweden and corroborated the low uptake of rescue regimes as indicated by Nyombi. 
They quoted statistics from a study by Cook, Pandit, Milman and Mason, who found 
that 20% of CVAs are successful, measured according to the extent to which they 
fulfil their plan and continue to trade free of insolvency (Cook & Pond 2006: 35). 
Business rescue: How can its success be evaluated at company level?
17 
With reference to unsecured creditors, Cook and Pond stress that an unsuccessful 
rescue will only provide a portion of the debt, whilst a successful rescue will provide a 
continued relationship with the creditor. Cook and Pond further conclude that, from 
an economic perspective, it is more important to ensure that the business survives, 
whether or not the company is preserved (Cook & Pond 2006: 22). However, they 
gave no suggestion as to how the survival of the business, as opposed to the company, 
could be formally evaluated.
Couwenberg (2001: 262) considered survival routes through bankruptcy. He found 
that, as a percentage of the total number of insolvency proceedings, companies that 
reorganised – namely through administrations, CVAs and receiverships – amounted 
to 14%, in contrast to the 86% that went into liquidation. In order to evaluate the 
success of the reorganisation procedures, the reorganisations were subsequently 
divided into confirmed reorganisation plans that were really liquidation plans, those 
that were really an asset sale plan, and lastly those that were really a reorganisation 
plan. Real reorganisation plans were then divided into those that were concluded 
successfully and those that were not (Couwenberg 2001: 264).
The first indicator of success would then be the number of companies that 
went into reorganisation, that had a confirmed reorganisation plan that really was 
a reorganisation plan (as opposed to a liquidation plan or an asset sale plan), and 
that successfully concluded the plan. He found a success rate of only 2% for those 
companies entering reorganisation (Couwenberg 2001: 263).
Couwenberg also considered a second indicator of success, namely firms that 
successfully went through the liquidation procedure in which a going concern asset 
sale was performed. Since a confirmed reorganisation plan could also really have 
been an asset sale plan, he also considered these asset sale plans together with going 
concern asset sales under liquidation. This second indicator of the success would 
then be that the firm (not the company) survived under this going concern asset sale 
scenario. He found that the firm survival rate in the UK would be increased to 20% 
if the successfully concluded reorganisation plans were added to successful going 
concern sales as described above (Couwenberg 2001: 265). Couwenberg’s findings 
are supported by those of Walters and Frisby (2011: 45), who found that the CVA is 
effective in rescuing companies, but that equally positive results may be achieved if 
assets are realised through a CVA, even if the company subsequently ceases to exist.
From the above evidence pertaining to the UK, it is clear that the following 
indicators of success should be taken into account in evaluating the success of a 
business rescue regime:
• Whether a company successfully concluded a reorganisation plan without re-
entering the bankruptcy procedure;
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• The return to creditors for a company that went into reorganisation; and
• Consideration of the real asset sale plans, not only for those companies that went 
into a reorganisation procedure, but also for those companies that went into 
liquidation.
1In the previous section the goals, criteria and supporting indicators were identified. 
Goals represent the long-term target of the legislation. The attainment of the long-
term goals can be assessed through the use of specific criteria, which must be met in 
the course of attaining a goal. These criteria, as well as a set of measurable indicators 
of success to support each criterion, are summarised in the next section.
Findings
1The objective of this study was to develop a set of evaluation criteria, supported by 
success indicators that are applicable to the South African business rescue legislation. 
The findings are presented below and discussed on the basis of the propositions set.
Findings linked to Proposition 1: The goals of the rescue legislation are clear
1The research data gathered indicate that all the rescue regimes have clear goals for 
their business rescue legislation. Three universal goals of the various regimes were 
identified in this study, as summarised in Table 2.
Table 2: The goals of the rescue legislation
xxivUSA xxvCanada xxviAustralia xxviiUK
xxviiiGoal 1
xxixThe company must emerge from business 
rescue as a going concern, and remain 
economically viable. 
   
xxxivGoal 2
xxxvIf goal 1 is not attained, creditors should 
receive a better return under the rescue 
regime, as opposed to immediate liquidation.
   
xlGoal 3
xliThe impact on all stakeholders should be 
benefi cial.
   
1The achievement of goal 1 and goal 2 was very clear from the literature investigated. 
Legislation in the USA and UK, as well as Canadian case law, recommends the 
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consideration of non-shareholder interest, although it is not mandatory to protect 
these other stakeholder rights. Goal 3 was therefore found to be precatory rather 
than mandatory (Olson 2010). Goal 3 can only be achieved together with either 
goal 1 or goal 2.
The research found support for the proposition that clear goals exist for each of 
the business rescue regimes. These goals are also in line with the goals of the South 
African Chapter 6 legislation.
Findings linked to Proposition 2: There are criteria, supported by 
indicators, that can be used to evaluate the success of the business 
rescue regime at company level
1The research data revealed that there is no standard international framework 
or evaluation tool for the evaluation of business rescue success. Successful 
reorganisations under a regime are evaluated using different indicators of success.
With respect to goal 1, indicators of success supported the criterion that the 
company must emerge from business rescue as a going concern, and remain 
economically viable. One indicator of success was if the company exits the rescue 
proceedings as a going concern. Going concern was implied by most researchers 
if the company was not liquidated. The data further revealed that the evaluation 
of success in the USA was more thorough and that further investigation was done 
on the going concern entity after some time. The further investigation was done 
by considering other indicators such as liquidity, debt ratios, profitability and the 
number of subsequent filings for business rescue. Research in the USA also showed 
that the performance of a going concern company could be compared to a portfolio of 
market shares in the long run, an indicator that was not found to be used elsewhere.
Pertaining to goal 2, indicators of success supported the criterion that the return 
received under business rescue should exceed the return that would have been 
received from immediate liquidation. If the company is liquidated subsequent to 
the business rescue proceedings, but the liquidation was in line with the original 
business rescue plan, some commentators believe that the business rescue procedures 
were successful if the return to shareholders was maximised whilst under business 
rescue. In this case the main goal (goal 1) of business rescue legislation was not met, 
although the secondary goal was achieved.
With respect to goal 3, indicators of success supported the criterion of considering 
the impact on all stakeholders. Indicators of success such as the decrease in asset 
size and the evaluation of whether key operations were kept in one company can be 
used. In some cases success is regarded as the company retaining its core businesses 
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and performing well after it emerges from business rescue. These cases are in line 
with the popular conception that business rescue is a ‘place’ where the company 
with minor financial problems has an opportunity to restructure and ultimately to 
continue operating as a going concern. If the asset size decreased dramatically or key 
operations of the company were lost, it implies that stakeholders (i.e. suppliers and 
employees) were most likely not protected. As indicated earlier, goal 3 can only be 
achieved in combination with goal 1 or goal 2.
In order to evaluate the going concern entities that emerge from business rescue, 
the above criteria and indicators of success can be used. The criteria and indicators of 
a successful business rescue are summarised and presented in Table 3, together with 
an indication of the particular regime where it was used to measure success.
Table 3:  Goals and criteria with their relevant indicators that guide the 
evaluation of success following a reorganisation, restructuring or 
rescue
xlviUSA xlviiCanada xlviiiAustralia xlixUK
lGoal 1: The company must emerge from business rescue as a going concern, and remain 
economically viable
liCriterion: The company should be economically viable on exiting business rescue as well 
as in the medium to long term
liiIndicator 1
liiiNumber (or percentage) of companies that 
exit business rescue as a going concern – 
going concern is implied if the company is not 
liquidated. 
   
lviiiIndicator 2
lixRestored liquidity of company – measured by 
liquidity ratios.
 lxi– lxii– lxiii–
lxivIndicator 3
lxvRestructured debt – measured by debt ratios.
 lxvii– lxviii– lxix–
lxxIndicator 4
lxxiRestored profi tability of company – measured by 
profi t margins, return on assets and cash fl ows.
 lxxiii– lxxiv– lxxv–
lxxviIndicator 5
lxxviiReturn to economic viability – measured by the number of 
subsequent times the company re-fi led for business rescue.
 lxxix– lxxx– 
lxxxiiIndicator 6
lxxxiiiCompare return received from rescued going 
concern company to return on a portfolio of 
market shares or matched peer company.
 lxxxv– lxxxvi– lxxxvii–
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xlviUSA xlviiCanada xlviiiAustralia xlixUK
lxxxviiiGoal 2: Better return to creditors than immediate liquidation
lxxxixCriterion: Return to creditors should be maximised
xcIndicator 7
xciDetermine if the approved plan (to maximise 










ciCompare return received under business rescue proceedings 










cxGoal 3: Protection of all stakeholders
cxiCriterion: Consider impact on all stakeholders
cxiiIndicator 9
cxiiiDetermine change in asset size. 
 cxv– cxvi– 
cxviiiIndicator 10
cxixDetermine if key operations were kept in one 
company. 
 cxxi– cxxii– 
1Literature about the evaluation of the success of business rescue in Canada, 
Australia and the UK was limited, most probably because of the uncertainty about 
how to evaluate the success. Statistical evidence on the USA was found to be most 
comprehensive. Because of the long history of the US legislation, more research has 
been done to date, and this research is seen as the benchmark for most of the other 
countries.
Based on the criteria identified above, the research found support for Proposition 
2 in that criteria, supported by indicators of success, are available and can be used 
to evaluate the success of a business rescue regime. The possible application of the 
criteria to the South African Chapter 6 business rescue regime is discussed below.
Findings linked to Proposition 3: The criteria and indicators can be 
adapted and applied to evaluate the success of Chapter 6 business 
rescue in South Africa at company level
1In South Africa, the King reports form an integral part of a company’s reporting 
responsibility. Among other things, companies are expected to be sustainable, show 
good corporate citizenship and involve all stakeholders in financial reporting. Olson 
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(2010) confirms that companies are expected to focus not only on shareholder 
profits, but also on social welfare.
The official unemployment rate in South Africa is 24.1% (StatsSA 2014). Chapter 
6 can support the South African government in achieving the macro-economic 
and social goals for South Africa by reducing business liquidations and thereby 
preserving the country’s levels of employment (Pretorius & Du Preez 2013: 189). 
The South African Companies Act is unique in the sense that it gives more power 
to employee groups and trade unions in comparison to the international countries 
evaluated in this study (Olson 2010). In South Africa, employees can be recognised 
as creditors; employees must be consulted in the development of the business rescue 
plan; employees are permitted to address creditors; and employees can buy out 
uncooperative creditors or shareholders (CIPC 2014). The High Court of Polokwane 
recently set aside the votes of creditors who voted against a business rescue plan and 
declared that the plan should be adopted. The court pointed out that the interests of 
employees should be considered (De Klerk 2014). South Africa therefore has a more 
holistic approach to business rescue.
The main objective of Chapter 6 is therefore to help the company to continue 
as a going concern, which will, in turn, help solve the unemployment issue. The 
secondary objective is to result in a better return for creditors than in the event of 
immediate liquidation. The main goals of Chapter 6 are in line with the goals of the 
international insolvency legislation we have researched, but with more emphasis on 
employee protection. We therefore submit that the evaluation criteria and indicators 
of success identified from international research can be used in the South African 
context, as the main goals are the same. Because of the social concerns in South 
Africa, and taking into account that the Companies Act does give more power to 
employees than does international legislation (Olson 2010), an additional indicator of 
success (indicator 11) can be added to the international criteria in Table 3. Indicator 11 
would be to measure the number of jobs that have been saved as a result of Chapter 6.
Key insights into how business rescue success could be evaluated at company level 
in South Africa were obtained from this research. Using these insights we propose a 
set of evaluation criteria, supported by indicators of success, as illustrated in Figure 
1. Our study focuses only on the formal Business Rescue proceedings as described in 
parts A to D, but since the Companies Act includes the informal compromise with 
creditors in the same chapter as the formal business rescue proceedings, we indicate 
both the formal and informal proceedings in the figure.
Figure 1 starts by distinguishing between formal and informal business rescue 
proceedings. Formal proceedings have the following two explicit goals, and one 
implied goal, namely:
• A restructured, independent, going concern company; or
• A better return to creditors and shareholders than under immediate liquidation; 
and
• The implied protection of all stakeholders.
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1
Figure 1:  Proposed process for evaluating the success of business rescue at company level in 
South Africa
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1Each goal is evaluated by a specific criterion and supported by a number of indicators. 
These indicators are further divided into three levels. A level one indicator can 
be used upon exiting the proceedings. Indicators at levels two and three could be 
applied after some time has lapsed since the initial exit from the proceedings.
Level one represents the first and most basic indicators, namely to determine 
the number of companies that exit as a going concern and those that have achieved 
a better return for their creditors and shareholders, either with or without the use 
of a going concern asset sale. At this level the protection of all stakeholders is also 
evaluated.
Levels two and three indicate that an important measure of reorganisation success 
is to determine if the company is economically viable in the medium to long term. 
The dashed lines in Figure 1 indicate that the performance of the company should be 
evaluated after some time has passed. The research data did not propose a clear time 
period, but we submit that a period of three years should be sufficient to determine 
the economic viability in the medium to long term.
Level two indicators evaluate the success of business rescue by assessing whether 
the company is economically viable in the medium term. Goal 1 is assessed through 
the use of indicators such as debt and profitability ratios, as well as the number of 
times the company subsequently re-filed for business rescue.
Level three indicates that the ultimate measure of reorganisation success is to 
determine if the company is economically viable in the long run. Since market data 
are normally incorporated in this indicator, a longer time period is more appropriate 
in order to reduce the effect of economic cycles on the indicator. Comparable financial 
information will not always be available, especially not for small and medium 
entities. For this reason, it is expected that evaluation on level three is unlikely to be 
performed in South Africa at this stage. If evaluation is done at such a high level, it is 
expected to be done on listed companies only.
It is important to note that there may be instances where an application of the 
above evaluation process may not yield a clear indication of success. In such cases 
judgement should be applied taking into account the goals of the business rescue 
legislation.
Conclusion and suggested future research
1Given the unemployment rates in South Africa, the expectations from government 
and the general public for successful business rescues in South Africa is high. Recent 
statistics on the success of the newly implemented business rescue regime can be 
questioned in the light of the international success rate. Accurate statistics based on 
international best practice are needed.
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The research done indicated that, since our business rescue regime has similar 
goals to the main international regimes, we could draw from the criteria and indicators 
of success used to evaluate the success of the international regimes to formulate 
criteria and supporting indicators to evaluate the success of the local regime. It is 
submitted that the evaluation criteria and supporting indicators that were identified 
in this article can be used to evaluate the actual success of business rescue attempts 
in South Africa in an objective manner. The ultimate success of Chapter 6 depends 
on the company’s ability to remain economically viable in the long run, which is 
indicated by debt ratios, profitability ratios and the number of subsequent times the 
company filed for business rescue. Since several criteria are considered important, 
future research may focus on the development of a matrix or scorecard to give proper 
weight to the different evaluation criteria and supporting indicators.
This paper indicates the importance of properly evaluating the success of business 
rescue. If we neglect this aspect, then, in the words of Marty Rubin: “Every line is the 
perfect length if you don’t measure it.”
Management implications
1The research findings indicated in this paper have management implications 
for the following affected parties or stakeholders: the CIPC, business rescue 
practitioners, post-commencement financiers and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC). The CIPC, as regulator, should require compulsory reporting 
on the indicators contained in Table 3. Existing data gathered by the CIPC will not 
support this attempt to evaluate the success of the regime. If the CIPC could collect 
the necessary information, business rescue practitioners could evaluate their own 
individual success as opposed to the combined success of all practitioners. Post-
commencement financiers such as banks could better assess the risk of providing 
post-commencement finance to companies under business rescue. The IDC could 
also better assess the ability of business rescue to save jobs and the company’s future 
ability to positively participate in and contribute to the economy as a whole.
Limitations
1The research that was done had the following limitations:
• Bias from the researchers in their interpretation of the data, as explored in the 
literature review;
• Timing of research. The research was done within the first four years of the 
new legislation. Academic research articles on business rescue success in South 
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Africa were limited, and reliance was therefore placed on international literature 
and communication with business rescue practitioners and representatives of the 
CIPC.
• Completeness of literature. Although the researchers made every effort to obtain 
applicable and relevant international research indicating the evaluation of success 
of a particular regime, it is possible that some data were missed. The impact of this 
limitation is somewhat reduced by the fact that sufficient and relevant research 
data pertaining to the leading corporate rescue regime, namely the USA, were 
found. The researchers drew comfort from this fact and consider it unlikely that 
research on some of the other rescue regimes would reveal better criteria for the 
evaluation of success than those discussed in this paper.
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